We study the tradeoff between social welfare maximization and fairness in the context of ad auctions. We study an ad auction setting where users arrive in an online fashion, k advertisers submit bids for each user, and the auction assigns a distribution over ads to the user. Following the works of Dwork and Ilvento [10] and Chawla et al. [12] , our goal is to design a truthful auction that satisfies multiple-task fairness in its outcomes: informally speaking, users that are similar to each other should obtain similar allocations of ads.
INTRODUCTION
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in today's society and can arguably have far-ranging social, economic, and political ramifications in many different contexts. One such context is access to sponsored information such as ads on social media, search pages, and other websites. It has been well documented that online ads can exhibit significant biases with respect to the viewers' sensitive features like race, gender, age, religion, and national origin. For example, certain employment jobs on Facebook have been found to be targeted exclusively towards men or excluded older people; and housing ads have been found to exclude viewers based on race [2] .
There are two main sources of unfairness in digital ads. The first is explicit or implicit targeting of users based on sensitive attributes by the advertisers. This sort of targeting is relatively easy to spot and correct for. Indeed, in response to a lawsuit brought on by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and ProPublica against Facebook on discrimination in housing ads, Facebook's first action was to disallow advertisers to target users based on sensitive attributes [15] . However it has been further documented that unfairness can persist even in the absence of inappropriate targeting of users [1] . The second, more subtle, source of unfairness is the ad delivery mechanism itself that determines for each user which ad to display based on advertisers' bids, budgets, relevance of the ads to the user, etc. Recent empirical studies [1, 16] have observed, in fact, that unfairness can arise in outcomes of ad auctions simply as a consequence of different levels of competition among advertisers for different users.
In this paper, we address the second source of unfairness: we study the design of ad auctions with an explicit fairness constraint. Informally, our goal is to design a truthful auction with the property that if all advertisers bid fairly then the outcome of the auction is also fair. In other words, the auction itself does not introduce any further unfairness than what may be present already in advertisers' bids. Fairness by itself is easy to achieve: for example, by displaying a random ad for every user regardless of the features (bid, relevance, etc.) of the ad. Can we achieve fairness while also ensuring high quality of the outcome? In this work, we focus on the objective of social welfare maximization and study the tradeoffs between the strength of the fairness constraint the auction satisfies and the social welfare it achieves.
Fairness of bids and outcomes. What does it mean for bids and ad allocations to be fair? We use the notion of individual fairness developed by Dwork et al. [9] , which endows users with a measure of similarity that captures all relevant and non-sensitive attributes of the users that can be used to differentiate treatment. For example, for employment ads, the measure of similarity may represent the educational level and job experience of a user. For credit ads, it may represent the users' creditworthiness and annual income. Individual fairness requires that users that are similar to each other should be treated similarly, but allows for some small room for variation. Applying this notion to our context, we require that every advertiser's bids on two similar users should be within a small factor of each other; the less similar two users are, the greater variation in bids is permitted.
On the other hand, we require the ad auction to assign a similar mix of ads to similar users. Formally, we employ the notion of multiple-task fairness of Dwork and Ilvento [10] , that extends individual fairness to multi-dimensional settings:
viewing the outcome of the auction for a particular user as a distribution over ads, we require that any two similar users are assigned any particular ad with roughly the same probability. In other words, the distributions assigned to the two users are close under ℓ ∞ distance.
One criticism of the notion of individual fairness is its reliance on an appropriate similarity metric on users that captures exactly what features can be used to differentiate between users. Where does this metric come from and who has the authority to certify that this is the right metric to use in a given context? We sidestep these questions in our work. We aim to develop auctions that are oblivious to the underlying metric in the following sense: if the bids submitted by the advertisers respect the fairness constraint imposed by the metric, then our auctions return fair outcomes with respect to the same metric without explicitly knowing what the metric is. However, if the bids are unfair, then our auctions provide no fairness guarantees. On the other hand, our performance guarantees with respect to social welfare hold regardless of whether the bids are fair. This approach separates the responsibilities of the auctioneer from that of an auditor, whose job it is to check whether advertisers are following fairness guidelines. In doing so, it potentially simplifies the design of both of these components of the ad auction pipeline.
The tension between fairness and optimality. Observe that standard optimal auction formats do not satisfy fairness even when the advertisers' bids are fair. Consider the highest bid wins auction, for example. Suppose that two users have very similar but not identical job qualifications, and an employment ad bids slightly different amounts on them. Then, depending on other bids, the highest bid wins auction may display this ad exclusively to one user and never to the other. In other words, the highest bid wins auction greatly exaggerates minor, subtle differences in input into huge swings in output. Can we design an auction to avoid such behavior?
Chawla et al. [12] previously studied the tradeoff of social welfare and fairness in the context of ad auctions. They developed a class of proportional allocation mechanisms that assign an ad to a user with probability proportional to some increasing function of the advertiser's bid. The choice of the increasing function depends on the strength of the fairness constraint satisfied by the bids. The mechanisms of [12] are metric oblivious, multiple-task fair, and achieve approximately optimal social welfare. However, their approximation guarantee for social welfare degrades polynomially with the number of advertisers. Is it possible to do better?
Our contribution: Inverse proportional allocation. We develop a new family of allocation rules that we call inverse proportional allocation. Informally, our auction begins by allocating each ad fully to the user. It then "takes away" the over-assignment from the ads in proportion to some decreasing function of the advertisers' bids. The choice of the decreasing function depends on the strength of the fairness constraint satisfied by the bids. As in the work of [12] , our mechanisms are truthful (for an appropriate choice of payments made by the advertisers), metric oblivious, and multiple-task fair. Also similar to the previous work, our auctions are anonymous across advertisers, online, and history independent. The advantage of our auctions is that they achieve a constant factor approximation to the unfair optimal social welfare, in a significant improvement over the previous work. In particular, the constant is independent of the number of advertisers, but depends in a mild manner on the strength of the bid fairness constraint. Moreover, our auctions achieve the optimal tradeoff between social welfare and fairness in some contexts.
Total variation and subset fairness. The family of proportional allocation mechanisms designed by [12] in fact satisfy a particularly strong fairness guarantee that they call total variation fairness: they guarantee that the distributions over ads assigned to two similar users are not only close under ℓ ∞ distance, but also close under ℓ 1 or total variation distance. One implication of this stronger guarantee is that users are not discriminated against even when considering sets of related ads rather than just a single ad. To take an example, suppose that two users Alice and Bob are similarly qualified for jobs, but that all high paying job ads bid slightly lower for Alice than for Bob. Then, an ad auction that satisfies multiple-task fairness may show every high paying job ad with slightly less probability to Alice than to Bob.
However, considering the set of all high paying jobs together, Alice may see a job in this set with far lower probability than Bob. Total variation fairness disallows this kind of discrimination.
We observe that our family of auctions does not always satisfy total variation fairness. Indeed it appears to be challenging to satisfy this stronger fairness property while also guaranteeing a constant factor approximation in social welfare. We show, however, that an intermediate fairness guarantee can be achieved. We consider a setting where an authority identifies a restricted collection of sets of advertisers over which fairness must be guaranteed. This may include, for example, all job ads belonging to a particular category or a particular compensation bracket, etc. We then develop auctions that guarantee fairness with respect to every set in the given family, while obtaining approximation ratios that degrade with the complexity of the set family.
We consider three kinds of set families, for each of which we provide subset fairness in conjunction with approximate optimality. The first kind of set family is composed of small sets. Here we show that inverse-proportional allocation coupled with a minimum guaranteed allocation to every advertiser obtains subset fairness. Our second setting consists of set families where each set corresponds to a union over few disjoint groups of advertisers. This captures, for example, settings where advertisers can be partitioned into a few subcategories (of arbitrary sizes) and fairness is desired over arbitrary combinations of these subcategories. Once again a "smoothed" version of inverse-proportional allocation provides fairness and good social welfare. Our last setting is complementary to the second one. Here we assume that advertisers are partitioned into small subcategories and fairness is desired over arbitrary subsets within any single subcategory. This captures settings where only one subcategory of ads may be relevant to any particular user, for example, ads for local services can be geographically categorized. In this setting, we combine inverse-proportional allocation with the proportional allocation algorithm of [12] to obtain guarantees.
Fairness across different types of ads. Throughout our work we assume that different advertisers participating in the system face the same similarity metric over users with respect to which they are required to bid fairly. This assumption makes sense when all ads belong to the same category of product. What if we have different kinds of ads competing, such as a job ad competing against a credit ad? Chawla et al. [12] argue that multiple-task fairness is too strong in such a context and propose a compositional notion of fairness that combines envy-freeness among users across different categories of ads along with multiple-task fairness within each category. We note that the algorithms we develop for a single category of ads combine in a straightforward fashion with [12] 's envy-free algorithms for across-category fairness to produce allocations that satisfy their compositional fairness constraint. In doing so, we significantly improve upon the competitive ratios they achieve, as our guarantees from within-category allocations carry over to the compositional setting.
Other related work
Fairness in ad auctions. Apart from [12] , other recent work has also studied algorithmic fairness in ad auctions. Celis et al. [7] design auctions that provide group fairness guarantees. Nasr and Tschantz [17] consider the complementary approach of modifying advertising bidding strategies to preemptively correct for unfairness introduced by the platform mechanism. These papers consider group fairness guarantees, in contrast to our work, which considers individual fairness guarantees.
Algorithmic fairness and social welfare. Recent work [7, 11, 17] has also considered the relationship between algorithmic fairness notions and social welfare. The fairness in ad auctions papers [7, 17] empirically consider the relationship between social welfare and group fairness guarantees. Hu and Chen [11] consider the relation between algorithmic fairness and social welfare from a theoretical perspective, though with a focus on classification. In contrast, our work provides a theoretical study of the relationship between individual fairness and social welfare in ad auctions. Fair division. Complementary to algorithmic fairness, there has been an extensive literature on fair division [5] that considers notions including "envy-freeness". In fact, the tension between fairness and social welfare has been considered in the context of fair division [4] . However, a major difference between the algorithmic fairness and envy-freeness is that algorithmic fairness generally focuses on individual qualifications, while envy-freeness generally focuses on individual preferences, though recent work [3, 12, 14, 18] has proposed definitions which combine aspects of envy-freeness and algorithmic fairness notions.
Outline for the rest of the paper
In Section 2, we present the details of our model for ad auctions along with fairness definitions. In Section 3, we describe our new family of allocation rules that we call inverse-proportional allocation algorithms. We analyze their social welfare and prove that they achieve multiple-task fairness, as well as show that they achieve the optimal tradeoff between social welfare and fairness in some contexts. In Section 4, we consider the stronger notion of set fairness, and develop fair allocation algorithms with social welfare that degrades with the complexity of the set family.
MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We follow the model for ad auctions described in [12] . Users drawn from a universe U arrive in an online fashion. There are k advertisers competing for one ad slot per user. When a user u arrives, the auctioneer runs an auction over the bids submitted by the advertisers and returns a distribution over the advertisers. We use b u to denote the vector of bids for this user and p u to denote the distribution returned. An advertiser is then picked from the distribution p u and the corresponding ad is displayed.
We use the notation p i u to denote the ith coordinate of the vector p u or the probability of allocation to advertiser i for user u. b i u likewise denotes the bid of advertiser i for user u. We now describe some desired properties the auction should satisfy, as well as a measure of performance for the quality of allocation.
Incentive compatibility. Interpreting p u as an allocation function that maps the bid vector b u for user u to a distribution over advertisers, we require that the function p u is weakly monotone in bids: for every user u and advertiser i, fixing the bids of other advertisers b −i u , the allocation to advertiser i, p i u , should be a weakly increasing function of the bid of advertiser i, b i u . Using the standard payment identity, weak monotonicity implies that the auction can be implemented in an incentive compatible fashion. Individual and multiple-task fairness. We assume that the universe U is endowed with a distance metric d that captures similarities between different users: the shorter the distance between two users, the more similar they are to each other. We use the notion of individual fairness from [9] to formalize the fairness properties of our auctions. Informally, individual fairness requires that similar users should receive similar outcomes. Definition 2.1 (Paraphrased from [9] ). A function f : U → O assigning users to outcomes from a set O is said to be individually fair with respect to distance metrics d over U and
In our setting, the space of outcomes is the set of all distributions over advertisers: O = ∆([k]). Accordingly, we need to define fairness with respect to an appropriate distance function over probability distributions. Different choices of the distance function provide different types of guarantees. Dwork and Ilvento [10] proposed using the ℓ ∞ distance over the probability vectors to define fairness. Their multiple-task fairness guarantees that the allocations to any single advertiser across two similar users are close. In the following definition, we reinterpret allocations as functions mapping users to distributions over advertisers. Definition 2.2 (Paraphrased from [10] ). An allocation function p : U → ∆([k]) satisfies multiple-task fairness with respect to distance metric d if for all u, v ∈ U and i ∈ [k], we have |p i u − p i v | ≤ d(u, v).
We observe that the notion of multiple-task fairness can be extended to the case where different advertisers may face different similarity metrics over users based on the features of their ads. For example, the notion of similarity over users for a jobs ad can be very different from the notion of similarity with respect to a housing ad. In such a situation multiple-task fairness requires every advertiser's allocation to be close across similar users with respect to their specific metric. In this paper we focus on the case where all ads competing against each other belong to the same category and therefore face the same distance metric. We refer the reader to [12] for a discussion of the different categories setting.
We note that our results in the single category case compose in a straightforward manner with the across-category mechanisms of [12] to provide hybrid guarantees.
For advertisers in a single category, Chawla et al. [12] propose a much stronger fairness guarantee than multiple-task fairness, based on using the ℓ 1 or total variation distance over the probability vectors. Total variation fairness guarantees that the allocation to any set of advertisers across two similar users are close. [12] ). An allocation function p :
Definition 2.3 (Total-Variation Fairness
Metric obliviousness. Following the work of [12] , we require our auctions to be oblivious to the underlying metric d over users. The metric d is implicitly encoded in advertisers' bids through a bid fairness constraint to be discussed in the following subsection. We require that the outcomes of our auctions satisfy fairness if the input bids are fair without explicitly checking or ensuring the corresponding fairness constraints.
This approach enables a separation of responsibility: the advertisers are held accountable for bidding fairly, while the platform is responsible for ensuring the allocation is fair as long as the bids are fair. In particular, our work calls for a separation between the tasks of (1) determining the suitability/relevance of different ads for a users; (2) auditing advertisers for fair bidding; and (3) running an auction to match an ad to an ad slot. The first and second tasks require knowledge of fairness requirements and should ensure that the input to the third task is fair in itself. We focus on the third task. While allowing the auction to consider the fairness constraints explicitly may allow for better outcomes, we believe it is undesirable for the auctioneer (or ad exchange) to possess and utilize such information. In fact in some contexts, the similarity metric over users may itself be sensitive information that an auctioneer is not allowed to explicitly use in decision making.
Symmetry and history obliviousness. In the spirit of designing simple mechanisms, we advocate for auctions that are history-oblivious: the allocation to every users is independent of the users that have previously arrived in the system and allocations made to those users. Another desirable property is symmetry across advertisers: permuting the bids of the advertisers permutes their allocations.
Social welfare. In this work we focus on the objective of social welfare maximization. Since we focus on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms, we may assume that advertisers bid their true values. The maximum social welfare achievable for any single user u is therefore max i b i u . On the other hand, the social welfare achieved by the allocation p u is given by p u · b u . We say that an auction achieves a competitive ratio of α < 1 for social welfare if for any sequence of users u and bids b u , we have:
Fairness constraint on advertiser values.
Informally, we require that for any two users u and v that are similar to each other (close under the distance metric d), every advertiser should bid similar amounts on the two users. If the distance between u and v is 0, the users should be treated identically and every advertiser should submit exactly the same bid on the two. On the other hand, if the distance between u and v is 1, the maximum possible, then no constraint is imposed: the bids on the two users can be completely arbitrary. For intermediate distances, we follow the approach of [12] and require that the ratio of the bids b i u /b i v is bounded by some function f of the distance between u and v.
We say that the bid function b i of advertiser i satisfies the bid ratio constraint f with respect to metric d if we have for all u, v ∈ U :
Observe that the smaller the function f is, the tighter is the constraint on the bids, and the easier it should be for the auction to achieve fairness. Following [12] , we characterize the strength of the fairness constraint on bids by considering an explicit family F of functions parameterized by a parameter ℓ ∈ (0, ∞):
Observe that larger values of ℓ correspond to stronger conditions on bids; see Figure 1a . Furthermore, for any
for all d ∈ [0, 1]. In this respect, the family F is fully expressive. We will describe our results in terms of the largest (strongest) parameter ℓ for which bids satisfy the bid ratio constraint f ℓ . Accordingly, we define the degree of fairness of an advertiser's bids as follows. Definition 2.5. We say that the bid function of an advertiser i satisfies degree-ℓ fairness if ℓ is the largest value for which the bid function satisfies the bid ratio constraint f ℓ .
Subset fairness
The mechanisms we design satisfy multiple-task fairness but not total-variation fairness. Chawla et al. [12] observe that in some settings multiple-task fairness is too weak: two users may receive similar allocations of any individual advertisement, but if many advertisements of the same kind are clubbed together, the two users may see an ad from this group with vastly different probabilities. This behavior can be considered discriminatory. Chawla et al. 's approach is to impose fairness with respect to arbitrary such groups of users. We take a more nuanced approach and consider notions of fairness that interpolate between multiple-task fairness and total-variation fairness. Specifically, we require the algorithm to satisfy fairness with respect to a restricted family of sets over advertisers. We also consider allowing for Lipschitz relaxations of the fairness constraints. Definition 2.6. Let C be a collection of subsets of [k]. An allocation p satisfies subset fairness with respect to C if for all C ∈ C, it holds that
More generally, for a parameter α ≥ 1, we say that p satisfies α-subset fairness if
Notice that when C contains all subsets of [k], then this definition is identical to total-variation fairness. When C only consists of subsets of size 1, then this definition reduces to multiple-task fairness. For intermediate collections C, the definition is stronger than multiple-task fairness but not as strong as total-variation fairness. Observe that we do not include singleton sets by default in C. Our intention is for the algorithm to satisfy subset fairness in addition to multiple-task fairness.
INVERSE PROPORTIONAL ALLOCATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we introduce a new family of auctions that achieve a good tradeoff between fairness and social welfare.
To our knowledge, the class of allocation rules we introduce has not been studied previously. The allocation rule we design is metric-oblivious but requires knowing the degree ℓ (i.e. strength) of the fairness constraint imposed on the 1 We remark that the precise form of the bid ratio function in [12] is 1+d
. The two functions are related to each other within small constant factors, and the form we use is mathematically more convenient for our proofs. advertisers' bids. We introduce the family of inverse-proportional allocations in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we analyze the social welfare of inverse-proportional allocations. Importantly, the competitive ratios we achieve depend only on the degree ℓ of the fairness constraint, and do not decay with the number of advertisers k. In Section 3.3 we prove that inverse-proportional allocations achieve multiple-task fairness. In Section 3.4 we provide upper bounds showing that inverse-proportional allocation achieves the optimal tradeoff between fairness and social welfare in some contexts.
Definition and basic properties of inverse-proportional allocation algorithms
The main contribution of this paper is a new class of allocation functions that we call inverse-proportional allocation.
Let us begin with an informal description of our mechanism. When a user u arrives to the platform, we first assign every advertiser an allocation of 1 (i.e. the full slot). Of course, this results in a total allocation of k units rather than the required total allocation of 1 unit, so we need to take away k − 1 units of allocation. The core intuition is that we take away these units proportionally with a decreasing function of the bids. We compute weights w 1 u , . . . , w k u that are functions of the bids on user u, and then set p i u to be 1 − w i u . In terms of fairness, this means that if two users u and v are close, then for any given advertiser i, the bids b i u and b i v will be close, so the weights w i u and w i v will be close, and thus the allocations p i u and p i v will be close. In terms of utility, relatively high bids will receive low weights, so a large portion of the allocation will be assigned to the highest bids.
More specifically, our allocation algorithm is parameterized by a decreasing function д : R ≥0 → (0, ∞], where д(0) = ∞ and lim x →∞ д(x) = 0. We then define the weights as
However, there is a problem: when b i u is very small, it may turn out to be the case that w i u > 1, and 1 −w i u is negative. In this case, we assign an allocation of 0 to the corresponding advertiser, and recurse to find an allocation over the remaining advertisers.
So both advertisers will receive nonzero allocations. Likewise, whenever k ≥ 2, at least two advertisers will be assigned nonzero allocation probabilities.
More specifically, the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm assigns nonzero allocation probabilities to exactly the K advertisers with the highest bids, for some min(k, 2) ≤ K ≤ k.
The inverse-proportional allocation algorithm satisfies all of the desirable properties discussed in Section 2. First, it is immediate from the definition of the algorithm that it is metric oblivious, history oblivious, and symmetric. We will now formally prove incentive compatibility. The following lemma shows that the allocation assigned to any advertiser is weakly monotone increasing in her own bid and weakly monotone decreasing in other advertisers' bids.
Lemma 3.2, by guaranteeing monotonicity, implies that the algorithm can be implemented as an incentive-compatible mechanism using an appropriately designed payment rule.
The social welfare of inverse-proportional allocation
We now show that the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm achieves good social welfare. Theorem 3.3. For any ℓ ∈ (0, ∞), the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with k advertisers and parameter д(x) = x −ℓ obtains a competitive ratio for social welfare of at least
Observe that at ℓ = 1, this gives us a competitive ratio of 3/4. 2 As ℓ → ∞, the competitive ratio goes to 1, while as ℓ → 0, the ratio goes to 0. Observe also that the competitive ratio is independent of the number of advertisers k. This is a marked improvement over the proportional allocation algorithms in [12] , whose competitive ratio degrades with the number of advertisers, approaching 0 in the limit as k goes to ∞. (See Figure 1b for a depiction of the growth rate as a function of ℓ.) Our improvement makes these algorithms practical in real-life settings where platforms service a large number of advertisers in a given category (e.g. employment).
The intuition for the bound 1 − 1 ℓ+1 ℓ ℓ+1 ℓ can be seen by considering a bid vector of the form
For the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д(x) = x −ℓ , a simple calculation shows that in the limit as k → ∞, the probability assigned to the bid of 1 approaches 1 − b ℓ . Thus, the competitive ratio becomes
ℓ ℓ+1 ℓ is the minimum value that 1 − b ℓ + b ℓ+1 can take over the interval [0, 1]. The proof of Theorem 3.3 (deferred to Appendix A) formalizes this intuition by showing that [1, b, b, . . . , b] is the "worst-case" for bids vectors in terms of competitive ratio.
Fairness of inverse-proportional allocation algorithms
We will now establish the fairness properties of the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm. Recall that we may assume that the bids provided as input to the algorithm satisfy degree-ℓ fairness. We will show that for an appropriate choice of д, the algorithm returns allocations satisfying multiple-task fairness. We choose д(x) = x −ℓ/2 . Theorem 3.4. Suppose that there are k advertisers. Then, for any ℓ > 0, the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д(x) = x −ℓ/2 satisfies multiple-task fairness when every advertiser's bid function satisfies degree-ℓ fairness.
Our high-level approach to prove Theorem 3.4 is as follows. Our goal is to show that for any users u and v, if the bid vectors b u and b v satisfy degree-ℓ fairness, then for every advertiser i we have
To prove this, let us fix a single user u, a distance d ∈ (0, 1), and an advertiser i. We will construct a worst-case bid vector b v such that p i v is as small as possible while respecting the bid ratio constraint for every j ∈ [k] at distance d = d(u, v). The monotonicity properties given in Lemma 3.2 enable us to identify such a bid vector: we decrease the bid of advertiser i by a factor of f ℓ (d) and increase the bids of all other advertisers by a factor of f ℓ (d).
Now, we need to bound p i u − p i v between these two users. The challenge is that the sets of advertisers that remain after the removal process in Step (5) of the algorithm might be different for these two users. Nonetheless, we show that we can reduce to the case where the users have the same set S of advertisers in the weight-assignment procedure, using the intuition that reintroducing the advertisers that were removed weakly increases the allocation on the other advertisers. We then handle the weight-assignment procedure directly.
More formally, we show the following two propositions. In the first proposition, we show that reintroducing advertisers that were removed in the removal process weakly increases the allocation of the remaining advertisers.
(The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A.) Proposition 3.5. Consider a user u, and suppose that b 1
Let R 1 be the set of advertisers with nonzero allocation returned by the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д on the bid vector b u . Let R 2 be any subset of [k] of the form {z, z + 1, . . . , k} for some z ∈ [k]. If R 1 ⊆ R 2 , then for any i ∈ S:
.
In the second proposition, we show the fairness of the inverse proportional assignment on any fixed set of advertisers in the absence of the removal process.
Then for every i ∈ S, we have:
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Let D := max 0, 1 −
. We need to show that, if
so the statement trivially holds. Thus, we can assume that |S | ≥ 2 for the remainder of the proof.
. Then we have that:
, then D ≤ 0, so the statement follows trivially. Thus, we can assume that min 1 |S |−1 , 1 1+B = 1 1+B for the remainder of the proof. Equivalently, we can assume that B ≥ |S | −2. In this notation, we can express:
From the conditions on the bid vector, it follows that
First, let's handle the case where |S | = 2. In this case, we have that
. At this value, we obtain: Thus, it suffices to consider max |B | ≥α ℓ (|S |−2) D ′ (B). Now, using Proposition A.2, we know that
). Hence, it suffices to show that D ′ (α ℓ (|S | − 2)) ≤ d. Notice that:
Notice that when α ≤ f ℓ (d), this expression is bounded by d as desired. □ Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 along with Lemma 3.2, provide us with the necessary ingredients to prove Theorem 3.4, as we described earlier. We defer the proof to Appendix A.
Optimality of inverse-proportional allocation
Finally we show that the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д(x) = x −ℓ/2 achieves the optimal competitive ratio achievable by any online allocation algorithm that given degree-ℓ fair bids satisfies multiple-task fairness.
To state our upper bound, let us fix the fairness parameter ℓ, the number of advertisers k, the universe U , and a metric d over U . We may then design an adversary that determines the order in which users arrive, as well as bid vectors assigned to each user that collectively respect degree-ℓ fairness with respect to the metric d, so as to force any fair online allocation algorithm to obtain low social welfare. Let U(ℓ, k, d) denote the maximum competitive ratio achievable by any algorithm given such an adversary. This quantity is an upper bound on the performance of any online allocation algorithm for the fair ad auction problem. Since we are interested in designing metric oblivious allocation algorithms, we further consider the worst case such bound across all possible distance metrics over U :
We show that the performance of inverse-proportional allocation essentially matches this upper bound for every value of ℓ. In particular, denoting the worst case competitive ratio of inverse-proportional allocation over k advertisers by L(ℓ, k), we prove that L(ℓ, k) ≥ U(ℓ, k) − 1/k. Further, recalling that our bound on the performance of inverseproportional allocation does not depend on the number of advertisers k, this implies that L(ℓ) = lim k →∞ U(ℓ, k). 
Our main technical ingredient for this optimality result is an upper bound from [12] on the competitive ratio of any multiple-task fair online algorithm. Chawla et al. [12] establish their upper bounds on instances with the uniform metric, where for all u, v, we have d(u, v) = d for some parameter d ∈ (0, 1).
Then there exists an instance of the fair ad auction problem over the uniform metric with d(u, v) = d for all u, v ∈ U , along with bid vectors satisfying degree-ℓ fairness, such that no online allocation mechanism satisfying multiple-task fairness can obtain a competitive ratio better than 1 A natural question is whether it is possible to obtain better guarantees if bids satisfy a different form of the bid ratio constraint. We show that this is not possible using inverse proportional allocation. Specifically, we show in Appendix C that in order for any inverse-proportional allocation algorithm (with a different choice of the function д) to match the fairness and welfare guarantees we achieve, bids must essentially satisfy the bid ratio constraint f ℓ/c for some constant c.
SUBSET FAIRNESS
We now turn to the notion of subset fairness defined in Section 2. We first argue that subset fairness comes at a cost: the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm defined in Section 3 satisfies multiple-task fairness, but we show that it does not satisfy total-variation fairness. In fact, there is a performance gap between algorithms that satisfy total-variation fairness and those that only satisfy multiple-task fairness, as we show in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we develop variants of the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm so as to satisfy fairness with respect to nice classes of subsets while also maintaining a good competitive ratio for social welfare.
A gap between multiple-task fairness and total-variation fairness
We begin by showing that the class of inverse-proportional allocation algorithms described in Section 3 does not satisfy total-variation fairness.
Example 4.1. Let k be any even number, and consider two users u and v at some distance d from each other. Suppose that for user u the algorithm receives bids of 1 from advertisers 1, · · · , k/2 and b from advertisers k/2 + 1, · · · , k; whereas for user v the algorithm receives bids of b from advertisers 1, · · · , k/2 and 1 from advertisers k/2 + 1, · · · , k. Then, setting b = 1/f ℓ (d) ensures that the bid vectors satisfy degree-ℓ fairness.
We now observe that for some (not too small) value of b, the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter ℓ/2 will assign p i v = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k/2 and p j u = 0 for all k/2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ k. As result, it would hold that
Example 4.1 shows that even for two users u and v that are very close to each other, there may exist a subset of advertisers on which u receives an allocation of 1 while v receives an allocation of 0. Thus, total-variation fairness is violated with respect to any reasonable Lipschitz relaxation. Is it possible to construct a different allocation algorithm that is total-variation fair but performs as well as inverse-proportional allocation on social welfare? We show that this is not possible for small values of ℓ: there is a gap between the competitive ratio achievable by any total-variation fair algorithm and the competitive ratio of the inverse-proportional algorithm.
Theorem 4.2. For any 0 < ℓ < ∞, let T (k, ℓ) be the optimal competitive ratio achievable by any total-variation fair online allocation algorithm (that is also metric-oblivious, history-oblivious, and symmetric) over an instance with k advertisers and bids satisfying degree-ℓ fairness. Let L(ℓ) denote the competitive ratio achieved by the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д(x) = x −ℓ/2 on any instance satisfying degree-ℓ fairness. Then, it holds that lim sup k →∞ T (k, ℓ) ≤ ℓ ℓ+1 and lim inf k →∞ L(ℓ)
Subset fairness over structured set families
Given the gap in Theorem 4.2, we ask whether good competitive ratios can be achieved if fairness is only required over some nice structured family of sets of advertisers as opposed to arbitrary subsets of advertisers. We show in the remainder of this section that such improved guarantees are indeed possible. In this section, we describe and motivate three kinds of set families that enable positive results.
As a warm-up, one might ask whether the challenge with ensuring total-variation fairness is that there are exponentially many fairness constraints to satisfy -one for each possible subset of advertisers. This turns out to not be the case.
Indeed, the proof of Theorem 4.2 relies on requiring subset fair allocation with respect to a collection of only Θ(log k) subsets of advertisers.
Our first observation is that subset fairness over sets of small size can be achieved without much loss in performance.
To formalize this, we define the "bandwidth" of a family of sets-the size of the largest set in the family-as a measure of complexity of the set system: While families of small sets may not be very interesting in themselves, this definition leads us to a more nuanced notion of complexity of set systems. Given a set system C ⊂ 2 [k] , we will say that two advertisers i and j are equivalent if they belong to exactly the same sets in C: for all C ∈ C, i ∈ C ⇐⇒ j ∈ C. This partitions advertisers into equivalence classes or clusters. Let L 1 , L 2 , · · · denote these clusters. Every set C ∈ C is then the union of some subset of the clusters.
We will define the "cluster bandwidth" of a family of sets, denoted ω cluster , as the maximum over all sets C ∈ C of the number of clusters contained in C.
Definition 4.4. Given the partition {L 1 , L 2 , · · · } of advertisers into clusters, as described above, the cluster bandwidth of a collection C ⊂ 2 [k ] of subsets of advertisers, denoted ω cluster (C), is defined as max C ∈ C |{i : L i ⊂ C}|. 3 With these values, we have (k − 1) (k /2)/(k /2−1) k /2+(k /2)((k /2)/(k /2−1)) = 1, and so the advertisers with bids b will get dropped.
Many interesting set families can have low cluster bandwidth. For example, when the sets C ∈ C are disjoint, the cluster bandwidth of the family is simply 1. Likewise, when advertisers have few relevant attributes, the cluster bandwidth is no larger than the number of different values the attributes can take. For example, suppose that we classify job ads according to whether they are high pay, medium pay, or low pay jobs, and whether they are tech sector, or finance, or academic jobs. Then there are nine possible kinds of ads and the sets in our collection may correspond to some subset of these nine types. Then, the cluster bandwidth of this set family is no more than nine.
Finally, we consider settings where the subset fairness constraints apply only over small sub-categories of advertisers.
For example, we may be interested in providing fairness guarantees across arbitrary sets of job ads relevant to a single geographical area. In this case, we would partition the set of all advertisers according to geographic location, and then enforce fairness over arbitrary subsets that lie entirely within a single component of the partition. The performance of our allocation algorithm will then depend on the sizes of the components of the partition. Definition 4.5. Let {L 1 , L 2 , · · · } be a partition of advertisers into clusters. Let C ⊂ 2 [k] be a set family where for each set C ∈ C, there exists an index i with C ⊂ L i . We define the partitioned width of C, denoted ω part (C), as max i |L i |.
Algorithms achieving subset fairness.
We now construct variants of inverse-proportional allocation that are competitive for social welfare while satisfying subset fairness over small-width set families as defined in the previous subsection. We use three building blocks for our constructions, put together in novel ways: the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm, the proportional allocation algorithm of [12] , and uniform allocation that assigns equal allocation probability to all advertisers. As described previously, inverse-proportional allocation aggressively favors high bidders but hurts advertisers with low bids when these are numerous. Proportional allocation, on the other hand, hurts advertisers with high bids when there are too many low bids. Uniform allocation allows for evening out the differences in allocation probabilities at the expense of losing out on performance. Accordingly, the three types of allocation rules address different aspects of fair allocation. However, putting them requires care so as to not magnify differences in allocation across different users.
We first describe a hybrid allocation algorithm designed to achieve subset fairness across small sets.
Algorithm 4.6. The modified inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameters д and T applies the inverse-proportional algorithm with parameter д with probability 1/T and uniformly assigns with allocation across all advertisers with probability 1 − 1/T . We show that the modified inverse-proportional allocation satisfies subset fairness on all subsets of size T and achieves at least a 1/T fraction of the competitive ratio of the corresponding inverse proportional allocation algorithm. Theorem 4.7. Let C be a collection such that ω(C) ≤ T . For any 0 < ℓ < ∞, the modified inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameters д(x) = x −ℓ/2 and T achieves subset fairness with respect to C as well as multiple-task fairness when bids satisfy degree-ℓ fairness, and achieves a competitive ratio of at least 1
Proof. Consider two users u and v, and suppose the bid ratio condition f ℓ is satisfied. For fairness, by Theorem 3.4, we know that the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д(x) = x −ℓ/2 assigns allocations p i u and p i v that satisfy |p i u − p i v | ≤ d(u, v). Now, notice that the modified inverse-proportional allocation algorithm assigns
For the competitive ratio, we note that the competitive ratio of the modified inverse proportional allocation algorithm is at least a 1 T fraction of the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д(x) = x −ℓ/2 . Applying Theorem 3.3 gives the desired result. This algorithm satisfies nice properties in terms of fairness and competitive ratio: Theorem 4.9. Consider collection of subsets C such that ω cluster (C) ≤ T . Then, given as input bid vectors that satisfy degree-ℓ fairness, Algorithm 4.8 with parameters ℓ/2 and T satisfies subset fairness with respect to C as well as 2-multipletask fairness. Furthermore, the algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of at least 1
Proof. Suppose the bids satisfy the bid ratio condition f ℓ . Then, using Theorem 4.7, the allocation q L i u L i ∈L , and by extension the final allocation p j u satisfies subset fairness with respect to C, since every set in C is a union of at most T sets in L. To show 2-multiple-task fairness, we use the fact that the allocations P j u j ∈L i satisfy multiple-task fairness by Theorem 3.4 and the allocations q L i u L i ∈L satisfy multiple-task fairness by Theorem 4.7. Thus, we know that |p 2d(u, v) . The competitive ratio follows from Theorem 4.7 (on the first-level allocation) and Theorem 3.3 (on the second-level allocation). □ Finally, we show that a similar two-step composition provides fairness for set families with small partitioned width.
For this setting, we compose the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with the proportional allocation algorithm in [12] . In particular, denoting the partition over advertisers as L 1 , L 2 , · · · , we use Algorithm 4.6 to perform the allocation across different L i s, and then use the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm to divide the allocation within each L i .
More formally: This algorithm achieves set fairness over the family C = ∪ i 2 P i and competitive ratio guarantees that degrade with ω part (C).
Theorem 4.11. Let L = (L 1 , L 2 , . . .) be a partition of [k] . Consider a collection C = ∪ i 2 L i such that ω part (C) = T . Given as input bid vectors that satisfy degree-ℓ fairness, Algorithm 4.10 with parameters ℓ/2 and L satisfies 2-subset fairness with respect to C as well as 2-multiple task fairness and achieves a competitive ratio of at least T − 1
Proof. Suppose the bids satisfy the bid ratio condition f ℓ . To show 2-subset fairness and 2-multiple-task fairness on C, we use the fact that the allocations P j u j ∈L i satisfy total-variation fairness by the properties of the proportional allocation algorithm shown in [12] and the allocations q L i u L i ∈L satisfy multiple-task fairness by Theorem 3.4. For 2d(u, v) . The competitive ratio follows from Theorem 3.3 (on the first-level allocation) and the competitive ratio bound in [12] (on the second-level allocation). □
FUTURE WORK
In this work we address the tradeoffs between fairness and social welfare through a simplistic model that assumes that advertisers bid to maximize their utility in every auction. In reality, advertisers have budgets and optimize for their long term returns. Incorporating fairness constraints into these more general models of ad auctions is an interesting avenue for future work. For the model we study, our work presents an alternative to the proportional allocation mechanism of [12] . The two classes of allocation algorithms perform well under different contexts, and it would be interesting to understand whether one can interpolate between the two to obtain fairness guarantees as strong as those of proportional allocation while at the same time achieving performance commensurate with that of inverse proportional allocation.
[16] Anja Lambrecht and Catherine Tucker. Algorithmic bias? an empirical study of apparent gender-based discrimination in the display of STEM career ads. Management Science, 65 (7) 
A PROOFS FOR SECTION 3
We prove the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma A.1. Consider the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д on k advertisers. Let b u be a bid vector, and suppose that b 1
In particular, this condition only depends on the advertisers who bid higher than i.
Proof of Lemma A.1. For the first direction, we show that if p i u = 0, then
). If p i u = 0, then at some iteration of the removal process (Step 5 of Algorithm 1), i is assigned a weight of 1. Consider the first such iteration. At this iteration, the set S in Step 5 of Algorithm 1 contains i at the beginning of this iteration. Hence, S is of
The weight on advertiser i is exactly
. This can written as
We show that p i u = 0. Assume for sake of contradiction that p i u > 0. This means that the set S of advertisers that receive nonzero allocation is of the
. We can write this as:
which we can write as:
, which is a contradiction. □
We prove an auxiliary proposition used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Thus function is increasing when X ≤ 1 √ C and decreasing when X ≥ 1 √ C . Thus, the maximum is attained when
Proof. Let's take a derivative. Notice that the derivative is − C
We prove Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let's consider an inverse-proportional allocation with parameter д. Consider a user u with bid vector b u . WLOG, consider advertiser 1, and the impact of changing bids on the allocation p 1 u . WLOG suppose that b 2 u ≤ . . . b k u . Let S be the set of advertisers who receive nonzero allocation. Suppose that b 1 u increases to some value c 1 u . Consider the bid vector [c 1 u , b 2 u , . . . , b k u ]. Now, suppose that when the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm with parameter д is applied to [c 1 u , b 2 u , . . . , b k u ], the set S ′ is the set of advertisers who receive nonzero allocation. Since д(b 1 u ) > д(c 1 u ), using Lemma A.1, it is easy to verify that, for every advertiser j 1, the condition for p j u = 0 becomes weakly weaker. Thus, (S ′ \ {1}) ⊆ (S \ {1}). On the other hand, by Lemma A.1, we know that the condition for p 1 u = 0 becomes weakly stronger, so if 1 ∈ S, then 1 ∈ S ′ . Advertiser 1's allocation weakly increases. First, we show that the allocation on advertiser 1 will weakly increase
. If 1 S, then it follows trivially that the allocation on u weakly increases as desired. Thus, we can assume that 1 ∈ S (and as argued above, this means that 1 ∈ S ′ ). Thus, S ′ ⊆ S. We break down 
, we know that the advertiser 1's allocation is continuous in its bid even at the values
Thus, it suffices to show that within each of these intervals (where the set of advertisers receiving nonzero allocations is fixed), as the bid increases, advertiser 1's allocation increases. Notice that on the bid vector
Other advertisers' allocations weakly decrease. Now, we show that the allocation on every advertiser i 1
If i S ′ , then the statement trivially holds. We can thus assume that i ∈ S ′ . Notice that this implies that i ∈ S.
Suppose that 1 S. Using that advertiser 1's allocation is monotonic in their bid, we know that there exists a maximum bid b ′ so that advertiser 1 receives a 0 allocation on the bid vector
We claim that the set of advertiser who receive a nonzero allocation on [b ′ , b 2 2 , . . . , b k 2 ] is also S. Note that b ′ ≤ min i ∈S b i u , and so by Lemma A.1, all of the advertisers in S will continue to receive a nonzero allocation. Moreover, for advertisers j S, we know that b j u ≤ b ′ , and so they will continue to receive a zero allocation. Thus, the allocation on advertiser i is the same for all bid vectors
, we also know that advertiser i's allocation is continuous in advertiser 1's bid at b ′ . So, we can actually just handle the case
In this case, we have that 1 ∈ S, so S ′ ⊆ S. By Remark 3.1, we satisfy the necessary conditions to apply Proposition 3.5. Thus, we have that:
, as desired. □
We prove Proposition 3.5.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. By Remark 3.1, we know that the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm assigns nonzero allocation probabilities to the advertisers with the K highest bids, for some min
it is straightforward to verify that S is of the form [a, k] for some a ∈ [k]. Moreover, since R 2 is given to be of the form {z, z + 1, . . . , k } and since R 1 ⊆ R 2 , this means that a ≥ z. Let's suppose that we run the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm on the advertisers in R 2 (i.e. we do not include the advertisers in [k] \ R 2 in the algorithm). Lemma A.1 enables us to relate the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm run on advertisers in R 2 to the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm run on advertisers in [k]. In fact, by Lemma A.1, we know that the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm run with advertisers in R 2 will also result in R 1 being exactly the set of advertisers who receive nonzero allocation.
Informally, we reverse the removal process for the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm on the advertisers in R 2 in order to go from R 1 to R 2 . Let c be the number of times that Algorithm 1 goes through Step 5, and let J i be the set that is removed in the ith iteration. It is easy to verify that the sets J 1 , . . . , J c are disjoint, adjacent intervals that satisfy
We utilize a set S, that is initialized to R 1 and will eventually become R 2 . This set S will track the behavior of the variable S in Algorithm 1 (in reverse order). We perform the following c step procedure. At step 0 ≤ s ≤ c − 1, we add advertisers J c−s . It suffices to show that, for every i ∈ R 1 , every step weakly increases 1 −
Consider the state of S prior to step s. At this step, J c−s is about to be added. It suffices to show that for any i ∈ R 1 :
Manipulating this inequality several times, we see it is equivalent to showing that:
, is exactly the weight assigned to advertiser n at Step 5 of the algorithm, in the iteration when the set J c−s has advertisers with weight bigger than 1. Since n ∈ J c−s , we know that 
. Suppose that the allocation to advertiser 1 is . These sets will both have size at least 2. If 1 S u , we know that p 1 u − d ≤ 0, so the statement trivially holds. Thus, we can assume 1 ∈ S u . We break into two cases: 1 ∈ S w and 1 S w .
Case 1: 1 ∈ S w . First, we show that S u ⊆ S w . It suffices to show that if i S w and i 1, then i S u . By
This implies that R i w = R i u . Now, the fact that i S w , using Lemma A.1, tells us that
. This means that
so applying Lemma A.1 again, we see that i S u . Now, we can apply Proposition 3.5 to obtain:
Let the RHS be p 1 * . Now, we can apply Proposition 3.6 to see that
. We claim that S u ⊆ R w . It suffices to show that if i R w and i 1, then i S u . Now, the same argument as in Case 1 shows that i S u (with the additional observation that if i R w , then using that 1 S w and Remark 3.1, we can deduce that i S w ).
Thus, we can apply Proposition 3.5 to obtain:
Moreover, observe that 1 − 
We know that this set is of the form {1, . . . , K } for some 1 ≤ K ≤ k. We can thus just consider bids b 1 u ≥ b 2 u ≥ . . . ≥ b K u for the remainder of the calculation.
Since multiplicative scaling does not affect the competitive ratio, we can scale the bids so that the maximum bid is 1. This conveniently makes the competitive ratio equal to the social welfare.
. Now, the competitive ratio is:
Our goal is to lower bound this expression. In particular, we wish to compute c independent of [B 2 u , . . . , B k u ] such that:
Notice that we can rewrite the desired equality as:
We use the fact that B 1 u = 1 and д(B 1 u ) = 1. Thus, we can write this as:
, where the indices are modulo K − 1. We apply the rearrangement inequality on the inner expression, using the fact that д(
As a result, we have proved the desired statement. (Implicitly, in this step, we partially reduced to the case where
as the following expression:
Hence, it suffices to choose c such that (1−c)д(B i u )+B i u ≥ 1 for all 0 < B i u < 1. We can write this as (B i u ) −l (1−c)+B i u −1 ≥ 0, which can be rewritten as
(Implicitly, in this step, we finished reducing to the case where B 2 u = . . . = B K u .) We can take a derivative to see that the minimum occurs at B i u = ℓ ℓ+1 , and obtain the desired bound. □ Proof of Theorem 3.7. We wish to show that L(ℓ, k) ≥ U(ℓ, k) − 1/k. For every k, we know that L(ℓ, k) ≥
. We know use the bound U(ℓ, k):
, which is equal to L(ℓ, k). Thus, we have shown that L(ℓ, k) ≥ U(ℓ, k) − 1 k . Let's show the result as k → ∞. Moreover, taking a limit as k → ∞, we obtain that L(ℓ) ≥ lim sup k →∞ U(ℓ, k). To obtain equality, we use the fact that the inverse-proportional allocation algorithm for k advertisers with parameter д(x) = x −ℓ/2 achieves multiple-task fairness (by Theorem 3.4), so L(ℓ, k) ≤ U(ℓ, k) − 1 k , which means that L(ℓ) ≤ lim inf k → U(ℓ, k). In particular, this implies that lim k→∞ U(ℓ, k) exists, and L(ℓ) = lim k →∞ U(ℓ, k). □
B PROOFS FOR SECTION 4
In the proof of Theorem 4.2, we use the following construction of users.
Example B.1. Let 0 < γ < 1, 0 < ℓ < ∞, and n ∈ N be parameters. We construct k = 2 n advertisers with as follows. All of the user we consider will have the same multi-set of bids in their bid vectors, but the ordering across the advertisers will be different. We define this set of bids B as follows: B will have 2 n−1 bids of γ n , 2 n−2 bids of γ n−1 , 2 n−3 bids of γ n−2 , ..., 1 bid of γ and 1 bid of 1.
We now design a sequence of users u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u n as follows. The multi-set of bids for all of these users will be B, but the ordering will differ from user to user. User u 0 will organize the bids in B so that b 1 u 0 ≥ b 2 u 0 ≥ . . . ≥ b k u 0 . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, user u i will organize the bids so that b j u i = b j u 0 for j > 2 i , and b j u i = b 2 i +1−j u i for j ≤ 2 i (i.e. the first 2 i−1 bids are flipped with the next set of 2 i−1 bids, and everything else stays the same.)
We define a partial fairness metric so that d(u 0 , u i ) = f −1 ℓ (γ −i ). It is easy to verify that the bid vectors satisfy the bid ratio condition f ℓ .
Proof of Theorem 4.2. To compute an upper bound on T (k, ℓ), we use the construction in Example B.1. The function of the bids structure of the algorithm requires that the allocation assigned to each bid is always the same. Suppose that
We claim that lim γ →1 2 − 1 1−γ ℓ /2 + γ ℓ+1 2
. We see that 2 − 1 1−γ ℓ /2 → 0 as γ → 1. Let's look at the second and third terms. Notice that: γ ℓ+1
We see that 
ALGORITHMS
We consider the family of inverse-proportional allocation rules with decreasing functions д(x) that take positive values to positive values. We show that for a large portion of the parameter range, the inverse-proportional allocation rules that we select are near-optimal within this family of allocation algorithms. For ease of analysis, we only consider optimality in the limit as k → ∞. In order to compare properly, we show the following simplified bound on the proportional allocation mechanisms with д(v) = 1/v l .
Corollary C.1. If l ≥ e −1 1−r , then the allocation rule with д(v) = 1/v l achieves a competitive ratio of at least r . A sufficient value ratio condition is f (d) = . Now, we show for a competitive ratio of r , this bound is pointwise near-optimal (up to a constant factor on l). (We ignore the dependence on k.) When s = e 5(1−r ) , the denominator becomes 5(1 − r ). It is straightforward to see that 1 
